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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE 
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT 
Robert C. Casad* 
FOR nearly one hundred years after the adoption of the Con-stitution no really important case concerning the interpreta-
tion of the religious freedoms contained in the first amendment 
was decided by the Supreme Court.1 Apparently there was suffi-
cient acceptance by the people of the meaning of the terms 
"establishment of religion" and "free exercise thereof" that litiga-
tion over their interpretation did not often arise. It did not occur 
to many people in the nineteenth century that Sunday closing 
laws, or Bible reading in school, were unconstitutional. Most of 
the cases involving the constitutional validity of state activities 
relating in some way to religion have been decided in the past 
fifty years. 
An examination of the reasons for the concentration of church-
state cases in recent years is beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
mentioned here because it is a phenomenon that has taken place 
contemporaneously with some others that, together, tend to sig-
nal some basic changes in the role of religion in American society 
and in the attitudes of the American people concerning religion 
in general. 
One of these phenomena is the growth in power and influence 
of the Catholic and Jewish minorities-"shifts in status of the 
nation's religious forces" that are said by one noted writer to have 
"pointed up a significant new pattern of American religious plu-
ralism which marks the end of the so-called Protestant era in 
American history."2 Another is the development, largely within 
Protestantism itself, that is called the "ecumenical movement."3 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas.-Ed. 
1 "The Supreme Court's concern with the religion clauses of the first amendment 
begins, for all practical purposes, with the case of Reyno.Ids v. United States [98 U.S. 145 
(1878)], where the Court first adopted the Jeffersonian .statement that the amendment 
erected 'a wall of separation between church and State.' " Kurland, Of Church and State 
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. I, 6 (1961). 
2 Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1961). 
8 The word "ecumenical," as defined in WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL D1CI10NARY 
(lid unabridged ed. 1961), means: "of, relating to, or being a chiefly 20th century move• 
ment toward worldwide interconfessional Christian unity originating in Protestantism 
and now focused in a world council of churches that is supported by many Protestant, 
Eastern Orthodox, and other church bodies and that promotes through functional organ-
izations cooperation on such common tasks as missions and work among students and 
[ 419] 
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During the time when the "new pattern of American religious 
pluralism" has been developing through the growth of Catholic 
and Jewish influence to end the "Protestant era in American his-
tory," a new spirit of Protestant unity has been growing, marking 
the end of the separatist era in church history. 
In recent years the Roman Catholic Church has begun to give 
tentative official support to the view that eventual reconciliation 
with the Protestants is feasible and desirable. The acceptance of 
the ecumenical ideal by the Roman Catholic Church removes 
virtually all doubt that in the ecumenical movement organized 
Christianity is facing an upheaval of major importance, compara-
ble perhaps to the Reformation.4 It is not likely to lose force after 
a few years, as so many minor religious movements do. It is def-
initely under way, gaining momentum year by year. It is bound 
to have far-reaching effects and give rise to a great many problems, 
like all dynamic movements aimed at changing the existing state 
of things. This article will attempt to identify some of the fore-
seeable legal problems that will arise in the wake of this move-
ment, and to examine the adequacy of the present law to provide 
solutions. 
The first problem to be discussed is the possibility that the 
policy underlying the first amendment religious freedoms is basi-
cally anti-ecumenical; this also involves the paradox this possibility 
poses in the light of recent decisions interpreting the establishment 
clause. The second problem area is that illustrated by the experi-
ence of one unfortunate church that was torn apart by schism 
because of a confusion of the ecumenical movement with left-wing 
political activity. The third problem area is that concerned with 
the legal consequences of denominational mergers. 
I. THE PARADOX OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 
One problem that presents itself at the outset lies in the fact 
that the constitutional religious freedoms may have been designed, 
through conferences mutual understanding on fundamental issues in belief, worship, 
and polity and a united witness on world problems." "Ecumenicity" is defined by the 
same source as "the condition of being ecumenically united in a worldwide intercon• 
fessional and interdenominational Christian fellowship." These terms will be used 
throughout this paper conformably to these definitions. See Visser 't Hooft, The Word 
"Ecumenical"-lts History and Use, in ROUSE &: NEILL, A HISrORY OF THE ECUMENICAL 
MOVEMENT 735 (1954). 
4 "[The ecumenical movement] has brought changes in religious thinking comparable 
to the changes caused by the 'Reformation' of the sixteenth century." LEEMING, THE 
CHURCHES AND THE CHURCH vii (1960). 
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in part at least, as a declaration of a public policy favoring the 
separation of the Christian church into a large number of different 
sects.5 One of the framers of the first amendment, James Madison, 
expressed the opinion that the policy of the country ought to be 
to promote a "multiplicity of sects," and that the first amendment 
was designed to accomplish this end.6 There have been no deci-
sions of the Supreme Court actually holding this, although there 
has been dicta suggesting that the first amendment has that mean-
ing.7 It is logically difficult, however, to conclude that the policy 
of the United States positively favors multiplicity of sects, yet at 
the same time opposes the establishment of religion and favors 
the free exercise thereof. 
The meaning of the establishment clause is not very well 
understood, even today.8 The recent decisions of the Supreme 
Ii See Stringfellow, Law, Polity, and the Reunion of the Church: The Emerging Con-
flict Between Law and Theology in America, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 412 (1959). 
6 "'In a free government,' Madison added, 'the security for civil rights must be the 
same as that for religious rights; it consists in the one case in the multiplicity of in-
terests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.'" Hunt, James Madison and Reli-
gious Liberty, I AM. Hrsr. Ass'N ANN. REP. 165, 170 (1961). "He [Madison] believed it was 
best for the country to have a large number of religious sects, but it is doubtful if he 
ever dreamed that the process of splitting up would go as far as it has.'' I STOKES, CHURCH 
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 348 (1950). For fuller treatment of Madison's idea of 
multiplicity, see Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1274, 
1287 (1961). 
7 That Madison was the author of the first amendment religious freedoms was recog-
nized by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947). In addition, he noted that resort might properly be had to the 
"documents of the times, particularly of Madison" for insight into the amendment's 
meaning. Id. at 34. Some writers doubt that Madison was author of the final form of 
the first amendment, cf. 1 STOKES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 538-49, but Madison's most 
authoritative biographer, Irving Brant, feels there is very little ground for arguing that 
Madison was not the author. "Madison was chairman of the three House conferees. 
There is no positive proof that he wrote the final version which came out of the con-
ference, but it was a House victory and neither Sherman nor Viring had displayed any 
interest in this subject. The guaranty that became part of the Constitution could be 
ascribed to Madison on the basis of the legislative history, even if its wording did not 
clearly identify him as the author." BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 
271 (1950). The Supreme Court has recently reiterated its acceptance of Madison's au-
thorship. In Engel v. Vitale, Mr. Justice Black, in the majority opinion, refers to "James 
Madison, the author of the First Amendment.'' 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). 
s Leo Pfeifer would disagree with this statement. He sees in the fact that Mr. Justice 
Black failed to cite a single judicial decision as authority for his majority opinion in 
Engel v. Vitale "the implicit assumption that the meaning of the no establishment clause 
is now so well settled and known that even a decent respect to stare decisis did not 
require citation of judicial authorities.'' Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 
RUTGERS L. REv. 735, 743-44 (1962). Edmond Cahn, on the other hand, whose personal 
views seem to correspond rather closely with those of Pfeffer on what the meaning of 
the establishment clause ought to be, finds in the establishment cases "one of the 
most baffling aspects of recent Constitutional doctrine in the Supreme Court.'' "Taking 
into account the whole train of recent 'establishment of religion' cases, what one faces 
is quite a juristic enigma.'' Cahn, supra note 6, at 1274-75. 
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Court in Engel v. Vitale9 and School District v. Schempp10 make 
it fairly clear, however, that the clause proscribes not only tangible 
fi~ancial support and official preferences as between religious 
groups or doctrines, but also any official support of religion in 
general or of particular institutions or doctrines.11 The problem of 
what institutional form a religion is to assume is basically a reli-
gious question, answered by each religious group according to its 
own beliefs. Official public support of one institutional form over 
another would seem to constitute an establishment of the favored 
form. Few would argue that it would not be an establishment of 
religion as well as a restriction upon the free exercise thereof if 
a law, applying equally to all religious groups, Christian, Jewish 
or others, were to require that the organizational structure of all 
groups conform to congregational principles of polity. By provid-
ing official sanction for one form of ecclesiastical polity, such a law 
would establish the religious doctrines upon which that polity 
rests. Similarly, a law that does not require conformity to that 
polity, but encourages it over all other alternative forms, would 
likewise seem to be an establishment. It might not violate free 
exercise in such a case, but it would be an establishment. Recital 
of the prayer in Engel v. Vitale was not required by the Regents; 
it was at most encouraged. The official support given the prayer 
was, nevertheless, held an establishment of religion.12 
9 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas, in concurring, placed the issue on the 
more familiar ground of financial support of religion. "The point for decision is whether 
the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise." Id. at 437. The ma• 
jority opinion of Mr. Justice Black does not seem to rest upon that ground, however: 
''When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a 
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to 
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes under• 
lying the Establishment Clause go much further than that." Id. at 431. (Emphasis added.) 
10 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
11 "The wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a 
recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about 
a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one 
upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government 
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment 
Clause prohibits." Majority opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
12 "The fact that no coercion is employed and that children are free to refrain 
from participation, or even from being present, is immaterial. The ban on establishment 
of religion, unlike that on laws prohibiting its free exercise, forbids any governmental 
activity in furtherance of religious purposes even if no direct compulsion is shown." 
Pfeffer, supra note 8, at 750. See generally on the meaning of the Engel case, Rodes, 
The Passing of Nonsectarianism-Some Reflections on the School Prayer Case, 38 Nonu: 
DAME LAw. 115 (1963); Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REv. 
25 (1962). 
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Before Engel v. Vitale and School District v. Schempp the es-
tablishment clause was usually understood to require equal official 
treatment of all denominations, none being preferred over another. 
It is now apparent that the establishment clause goes farther and 
requires not only that one denomination shall not be preferred 
over another, but also that religion itself shall not be preferred 
over irreligion.13 The Court's willingness to consider "religion" 
at a higher level of abstraction suggests, if it was not already im-
plicit, that the impact of the establishment clause on the Christian 
religion does not necessarily have to be viewed at the denomina-
tional level. In this country we have tended to consider the Chris-
tian religion as being necessarily embodied in a varying number 
of denominational churches, but there is nothing absolute about 
this system of denominational churches. It is the product of his-
torical forces that may now be largely spent. It is just as appro-
priate-perhaps more so-to regard the Christian religion as 
being embodied in one universal "church," with each denomina-
tion being viewed as a subdivision of that larger body.14 If the 
"church" is viewed at that level, instead of each denomination 
being considered a separate church or separate religion, it seems 
clear that a law requiring that larger "church" to adhere to the 
institutional structure of multiple sects would be an establishment 
of religion in the same sense that a law requiring denominations 
to adopt congregational polity would be. Likewise, it would seem 
18 "[T]his court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the establishment 
clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another." School Dist. 
v. Schempp, !174 U.S. 20!1, 216 (196!1); cf. note 11 supra. 
14 Much of the confusion in the subject of church and state relations surely must 
stem from the fact that the word "church" bas so many different meanings. Since all of 
the alternative meanings relate to a religious institution of some sort, formal or informal, 
the prohibition against establishment should apply to every meaning of the word 
"church." The word is used in two different senses in the Bible: (I) the entire body 
of believers who comprise the "body of Christ" or the Church catholic; and (2) any 
local congregation of believers. See, e.g., Taylor, The Biblical Doctrine of the Church 
and its Unity, in NELSON, CHRISTIAN UNITY IN NORTH AMERICA 43, 44, 51 (1958). In mod-
em usage, however, the word has still other meanings. Principally, it is applied to dif• 
ferent denominations or communions, such as the Methodist Church and the Presby-
terian Church. 
"It is impossible to avoid the modem usage, and to confine our use of the words 
'church' and 'churches' to describe what they mean in the New Testament. We have 
to do two things: (i) recognize frankly that our modem usage is unbiblical and that 
therefore we must be careful how we seek to find in New Testament passages the answer 
to our present day problems, and (ii) be careful, in considering any modem statement, 
to determine from the context the sense in which the word 'church' is being used." 
Report of conversations between representatives of the Archbishop of Canterbury and 
of the Evangelical Free Churches in England, quoted in LEEMING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 
278. 
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that a law officially encouraging that larger church to assume the 
form of multiple sects in preference to a unitary, catholic institu-
tional form would be an establishment, just as a law encouraging 
denominations to adopt congregational polity would be. 
If the Madisonian principle of multiplicity of sects is deemed 
to be incorporated into the first amendment religious freedoms, 
then, a sort of paradox is produced. The first amendment itself 
would, in that event, accomplish what it specifically forbids-the 
establishment of religion-since it would officially support one 
institutional form, and perhaps prefer that form over an alterna-
tive form. 
This is not a true paradox, of course. The first amendment in 
terms only denies Congress the power to effect an establishment 
of religion. There is no reason why the Constitution could not 
establish some religious view or doctrine, but in view of the 
strong language of prohibition it contains, and of the round-
about way in which it would accomplish the establishment if the 
multiplicity principle were read in, it does not seem likely that 
the framers consciously thought they were establishing anything. 
Rather, they probably thought of themselves as laying the philo-
sophical foundation for a complete disestablishment. 
When the first amendment was adopted, the religious climate 
in America was such that the multiplication of sects was foreseea-
ble as a probable consequence of the disestablishment of religion.15 
If official support was removed from the established churches, they 
were in a less favorable position to compete with vigorous, relative-
ly new groups such as the Baptists and Methodists, and less able 
to resist divisive schisms within their own institutional structures. 
But the fact that multiplicity of sects was a likely result of dis-
establishment at that point in history does not mean that the 
multiplicity of sects was the objective of disestablishment. Madi-
son may have felt it a desirable objective, but it was desirable to 
him primarily for political reasons: to prevent the concentration 
of too much power in the hands of a few institutions and to facili-
tate the control of religious strife.16 Political expediency, however, 
15 See NIEBUHR, THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONALISM (1954). 
16 "Madison followed Voltaire in insisting, as he frequently did, that the best possible 
safeguard of religious freedom was not in legal guarantees but in the sheer multiplicity 
of religious sects." Cahn, supra note 6, at 1287. Voltaire, commenting upon religion in 
England, said: "If there were one religion in England, its despotism would be terrible; 
if there were only two, they would destroy each other; but there are thirty, and there· 
fore they live in peace and happiness." Quoted in STOKES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 228. 
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is hardly more palatable as a reason for supporting the multiplicity 
of sects than as a reason for suppressing particular sects or for 
establishing a politically controlled state church. 
There may be better reasons than political expediency, how-
ever. There were religious groups then, and there are some now, 
who regarded the multiplicity of sects as a valid religious principle; 
they supported on a religious basis the principle Madison accepted 
on political grounds.17 The fact that some religious groups found 
religious support for the principle, of course, does not justify its 
adoption as official public policy. It does, however, tend to explain 
why the notion that the first amendment favors multiplicity of 
sects has received widespread support. The groups who approve 
the principle on religious grounds have supported the view that 
the Constitution embodies that principle, and those groups have 
comprised a large proportion of the population and, in some re-
gions of the country, have constituted the most influential religious 
institutions. 
If the first amendment must be read as encouraging the mul-
tiplicity of sects it could prove to be a serious impediment to the 
ecumenical movement, since the ultimate aim of that movement 
is to unify, not multiply, the sects. The logical problems noted 
above may prevent the Court from reading the principle of mul-
tiplicity of sects into the first amendment when the chips are 
down, but a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and other 
courts indicate that, regardless of whether the multiplicity of sects 
principle was embodied in the first amendment by its framers, the 
courts will favor multiplicity anyway.18 These decisions, for the 
most part rendered on non-constitutional grounds with little or 
no discussion of possible constitutional implications, are cases in 
17 Certain religious groups, then as now, emphasize the extremely individualistic 
nature of religion. These groups reject creeds, dogmas and heirarchies-in short, all 
elements that tend to make the practice of religion uniform for all believers. These 
beliefs lead to congregational principles of polity and to the view that "any group of 
like-minded and professed believers have the right to organize themselves into a church." 
SPERRY, RELIGION IN AMERICA 9 (1945). Baptists and Quakers were leading advocates of 
tl1is doctrine. Today the largest of the Baptist bodies, the Southern Baptist Convention, 
remains unaffiliated with the National and ,vorld Councils of Churches, and bas thus 
far demonstrated little enthusiasm for the ecumenical movement. Theron D. Price, 
speaking unofficially of, not for, Southern Baptists, has said: "We tend-partly because 
we are busy with the work which we believe God has given us to do-to be oblivious 
to the need for wider unity [i.e., wider than the spiritual unity all Christians share] . 
• • • [I]t would be difficult to convince us that the visible reduction of the mystical body 
to one legal corporation would enhance the true unity of the Church." Price, A Southern 
Baptist Views Church Unity, in NELSON, CHRISTIAN UNITY IN NORTH AMERICA, 81, 87 (1958). 
18 See Stringfellow, supra note 5; 13 ECUMENICAL R.Ev. 287 (1961). 
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which the court takes sides in a controversy within a religious in-
stitution between a faction favoring change and a faction favoring 
the status quo.19 As will be shown in a later section of this paper, 
the courts generally favor the status quo, which in most cases now 
happens to be a system of multiple separate sects. There is some 
basis for contending that these judicial doctrines tending to pre-
serve the status quo have constitutional status;20 thus, even though 
the principle of multiplicity of sects itself is not read into the first 
amendment's provisions, the effect may be about the same as if 
it were. One writer has concluded that the effect of the judicial 
preference for the status quo has been to create a "multiple es-
tablishment."21 The courts have interpreted the first amendment 
religious freedoms as requiring the complete absence of any state 
support for religious institutions or doctrines or exercises, but at 
the same time the courts, as agencies of the state, have consistently 
lent their support to a particular pattern of religious organization. 
There may be a danger in this situation, and especially so since it 
involves a field where basic ideas are in upheaval, as they seem to 
be today in the area of religious institutions. The ecumenical 
movement is having an ever-widening effect in changing basic, 
longstanding notions about the importance of denominational 
distinctiveness. It is inducing changes in theories as to the nature 
and role of denominations and probably in notions of religious 
freedom as profound as the changes wrought by the labor move-
ment in theories relating to freedom of contract. Unless the courts 
are made aware of these changes they are likely to go on applying 
to present-day problems rules of law developed to meet the needs 
of an older order, without realizing that in so doing they are cast-
ing themselves in a partisan role in a struggle between the old and 
the new, in which the state should really be neutral. 
The ecumenical movement cannot continue to grow in scope 
and influence unless the individual church members support the 
movement. It follows that if the ecumenical movement does con-
tinue to grow, it will indicate that more and more people are 
undergoing these basic changes in religious attitudes and aspira-
tions. To be effective the Constitution must not be seriously in-
consistent with the religious views of a majority of the people. 
19 See text accompanying note 107 infra. 
20 See text accompanying notes 115-18 infra. 
21 Stringfellow, supra note 5, at 435. 
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Separatism22 may have been sound public policy when the Con-
stitution was adopted because it was not inconsistent with the 
basic religious desires of the people whose voices, in concert, were 
the most influential.23 But will separatism be sound policy when 
the basic religious desires of the people favor ecumenicity? Can 
meaningful religious freedom be achieved in a society where 
political institutions operate under a policy of separatism while 
the religious institutions are striving for ecumenicity?24 
II. THE CASE OF Huber v. Thorn 
Attention is now turned to the second problem. The institu-
tional vehicle for the ecumenical movement in the United States 
is the National Council of Churches, which in turn is affiliated 
with the World Council of Churches. These organizations are 
working to break down the barriers that divide the denominations. 
Most of the Protestant and Orthodox Christian bodies participate 
in these councils. Because religious questions frequently have 
economic and political questions closely connected with them, 
the Councils feel it advisable from time to time to take a stand on 
certain issues that have definite political implications.25 This ex-
poses the Councils to strong criticism by those who oppose their 
views. Since the Councils are primarily identified with the ecu-
menical movement, opposition to their activities that is based 
upon bona fide theological objections to ecumenism tends to be 
confused with opposition to their political positions. 
An excellent illustration of this and of the serious problems 
that may stem from it is the recent case of Huber v. Thorn.26 That 
case was a contest for control of the church properties between 
rival factions of the First Baptist Church of Wichita, said to have 
22 The word "separatism" is used here to refer to the religious principle that each 
variation of religious belief is entitled to a separate institutional body. In this sense it 
does not refer to the principle of disestablishment. It is the organizational separation 
of religious groups from each other, not the separation of church and state. 
28 I.e., separatism was not inconsistent with what Professor Robert Rodes, Jr., has 
called the "defining consensus." Rodes, supra note 12, at 122. 
24 Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in School Dist. v. Schempp, recognized the "en-
demic" difficulty of distinguishing between hostility toward religion and neutrality. 
"Freedom of religion will be seriously jeopardized if we admit exceptions for no better 
reason than the difficulty of delineating hostility from neutrality in the closest cases." 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 246 (1963). 
25 See, e.g., Statement on Nuclear Weapons Testing, adopted by the Executive Com-
mittee of the World Council of Churches at Geneva, February, 1961, 13 ECUMENICAL REv. 
365 (1961). 
26 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962). 
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been the largest church in the American Baptist Convention. A 
majority of the voting members voted to withdraw from the 
American Baptist Convention, and suit was brought by the minor-
ity faction to enjoin the use of the church properties by the major-
ity group. The opinion of the court refrains, perhaps wisely, from 
detailing the facts of the underlying problem. The only reference 
to the ideological dispute that produced the schism was this mys-
terious passage: "It will be noted that the fault was found with 
the National Council of Churches and not specifically with the 
American Baptist Convention. This alleged fault is beyond the 
scope of this opinion, but those interested may see an article in 
Look Magazine for April 24, 1962."27 The article the court refers 
to concerns the existence of several nominally religious rightist, 
anti-communist organizations and the impact that these groups are 
having upon the regular churches, both Catholic and Protestant. 
The National Council of Churches and the World Council of 
Churches have come to be viewed by these groups as organizations 
bent upon left-wing subversion. Many people and groups oppose 
the ecumenical movement on bona fide theological grounds, and 
common opposition tends to draw these together with the rightist 
extremists at times. This apparently is what happened in the First 
Baptist Church of Wichita. Some of the story can be gleaned from 
the records and briefs filed in the appeal, but much of it does not 
appear even there. It is worth description because the same kind 
of schism could easily occur in many churches throughout the 
country as the ecumenical movement advances. 
In January, 1960, a group of laymen in the church voluntarily 
submitted a report to the board of deacons. The report stated 
that the group was drawn together by an awareness, among other 
things, "that there is a definite ecumenical movement afoot to tie 
and bind Protestant churches (including Baptist) into one or-
ganization. In other words, a universal Protestant Church with 
leaders and spokesmen who 'declare' for all Protestant Christians 
within their organization."28 Prompted by this awareness, the 
group "made a study to attempt to find the facts about the ecu-
menical movement. It wasn't difficult to find that the National 
Council of Churches was the leading proponent of this move-
27 Id. at 635, 371 P.2d at 146. The article referred to is The Rightist Crisis in Amer-
ican Churches, Look, April 24, 1962, p. 40. 
28 REP'T TO THE Bo. OF DEACONS, FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH, ·w1cHrrA, KAN. I Gan. 26, 
1960). 
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ment."29 The references for the study were drawn primarily from 
two sources (both mentioned in the Look article alluded to in 
the court's opinion); Bundy, Collectivism in Churches, and a tract 
entitled How Red Is the National Council of Churches. From 
these works it was found that the National Council had "a long 
record of left-wing activities" ;30 that "many leaders in the National 
Council of Churches are associated with Communist-front organi-
zations" ;31 and that the American Baptist Convention "supports 
the ecumenical movement as advocated by the National Council 
of Churches."32 Concluding that the local church could no longer 
subscribe to the policies of a convention that supported the Na-
tional Council, the group recommended that the church cut off 
its financial support of the American Baptist Convention. 
In response to this report the church, in March, 1960, voted 
II 74 to 235 to withdraw financial support from the American 
Baptist Convention, and in July, 1960, voted 739 to 294 to sever 
all relations with the Convention. The minority group refused to 
accept this decision and tried for a time to hold separate services 
in the church building. This situation proved intolerable to the 
majority group, and eventually the minority group was locked 
out. The minority sought judicial relief to obtain the church prop-
erties, and its suit eventually succeeded. 
The point to be noted about the case is not the decision of the 
court giving the property to the loyal minority faction. This result 
is not a new departure in any sense of the word.33 The point is that 
here a strong, thriving church was torn by an irreconcilable schism, 
ostensibly over the issue of participation in the acti_vities of the 
National Council of Churches. In the course of the conflict the 
ecumenical movement came to be identified, in the eyes of its 
opponents, with left-wing political action. The ecumenical move-
ment must overcome much internal opposition, some based upon 
religious considerations and some on political considerations. This 
may be necessary even within the denominations that theoretically 
support the movement, as this case clearly shows, to say nothing 
of overcoming the basic theological objections of the denomina-
tions that oppose it, among which is the largest single Protestant 
20 Ibid. 
30 Id. at 4. 
31 Id. at 6. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See text accompanying notes 74-78 infra. 
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denomination in America, the vigorous and growing Southern 
Baptist Convention.84 
Ill. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF DENOMINATIONAL MERGERS 
Apart from the potential problems of basic philosophy arising 
from the constitutional paradox and problems like that illustrated 
by Huber v. Thorn, the ecumenical movement is bound to spawn 
a host of very practical legal problems. The first objective evidence 
of the movement in a church or denomination is likely to be an 
impulse toward organic merger with other groups of similar 
idealogy and polity. Although the World Council of Churches 
does not claim organic reunification as an immediate objective,85 
its work in breaking down barriers to cooperation and reconcilia-
tion will inevitably encourage institutional mergers.36 As the value 
of maintaining distinctive organizations diminishes in the eyes of 
the different denominational groups, economics and the motives 
of good stewardship, to say nothing of other motives equally 
strong or stronger, will impel the denominations to mergers and 
consolidations. This conclusion is not based on speculation alone. 
The past fifty years-the period, roughly, of the ecumenical move-
ment-have seen the merger and consolidation of several impor-
tant denominations in this country, in Canada, in Scotland, and 
elsewhere throughout the world.87 The organizational unifications 
that resulted in the Evangelical and Reformed Church, the United 
Lutheran Church in America, the Congregational Christian 
34 Probably as a response to the tragedy of the Wichita church some unofficial meet• 
ings of representatives of the Southern and American Baptist Conventions have been 
held recently, at which the possibility of eventual merger of the two denominations, 
among other things, was discussed. These meetings, although strictly unofficial, may 
herald a relaxation in the traditional Southern Baptist attitude of non-affiliation with 
other groups. See Crusader: The American Baptist Newsmagazine, Jan. 1963, p. 3. 
85 "Among the misinterpretations of the attitude of the World Council towards 
church unity, these are of special importance. 
"The first pretends that the World Council makes organic unity an end in itself 
and stands for unity at any price. It is an astonishing fact that in spite of all that we 
have said and done in order to show that we do not believe in union per se [there are 
still those who hold that we do]." Visser 't Hoon, Various Meanings of Unity and the 
Unity Which the World Council of Churches Seeks To Promote, 8 ECUMENICAL REV. 17, 
22 (1955). 
86 "The distinction [between "Christian unity" and "Church union'1 is very im• 
portant. • • • In the end these cannot be separated, because Christian unity as it be• 
comes deeper will find expression in some form of Church union over wide areas of 
Protestantism and perhaps beyond ..•. " Bennett, The American Churches in the Ecu-
menical Situation, 1 ECUMENICAL REv. 57, 58 (1948). 
8'1' See NEILL, TOWARDS CHURCH UNION 1937-1952 (1952); ROUSE &: NEILL, A HISTORY OF 
THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT, 1517-1948 (1954); SILCOX, CHURCH UNION IN CANADA (1933). 
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Church, the Methodist Church, and very recently the United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., demonstrate the strength of 
the impulse away from separatism in these large and important 
denominations, comprising almost twenty million communicants. 
The denominational merger of the Congregational Christian and 
the Evangelical and Reformed churches in 1957 to form the 
United Church of Christ indicates the feasibility of union even 
by denominations adhering to entirely different forms of polity. 
It is fairly safe to assume that there will be other important 
mergers among major Protestant denominations in the next few 
years. It seems likely that the Disciples of Christ will seek union 
with the United Church of Christ. The Methodist Church and 
the Protestant Episcopal Church are studying such immediate 
matters as the unification of ministries and intercommunion with 
a long-range goal of organic union. Several Lutheran bodies are 
studying the possibilities and problems of organic union. The 
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. has hopes of eventually 
concluding a postponed unification with the "Southern" Presby-
terians (Presbyterian Church in the U.S.).38 There have been tenta-
tive and unofficial discussions of the prospects of reunification 
between the American Baptist Convention and the Southern Bap-
tist Convention.89 
This is not to suggest that general reunification of the Christian 
church is imminent. As is true of every movement that looks to-
ward far-reaching changes in the existing order, the ecumenical 
movement has many strong opponents as well as proponents within 
organized Christianity, as Huber v. Thorn demonstrates so clearly. 
Schisms requiring judicial solution can arise from the mere exis-
tence of the movement, even before any steps toward organic 
unification are taken.40 Whenever any action is taken to unite or 
merge denominations, serious legal problems are virtually certain 
to arise. If these problems are brought before the courts, legal 
doctrines that will be applied in solving them, as has been noted 
previously,41 tend generally to oppose ecumenicity and to favor 
separatism. 
88 See Nelson, Survey of Church Union Negotiations, 9 ECUMENICAL REv. 284, 292·96 
(1957). 
89 See note ll4 supra. 
40 Cf. Stansberry v. McCarty, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683 (1958); Bramlett v. Young, 
229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956). 
41 See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
432 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
A. Judicial Cognizance of Temporal Disputes 
Ideally, it would seem, the law should be absolutely neutral in 
this matter.42 The decision whether to unite or cooperate with 
other groups is a religious question which in itself should be of 
concern to no one except the groups involved. The choice is one 
to be made by the groups in the exercise of their own religious 
beliefs, and their freedom to make this choice is supposed to be 
guaranteed by the Constitution against federal or state interfer-
ence.43 Indeed, the courts frequently declare that they have no 
power to decide religious questions. This does not mean, however, 
that courts will not exercise jurisdiction over religious institu-
tions under any circumstances. Religious organizations are not 
above or outside the law. They have temporal rights and duties 
with respect to their properties, contracts, etc., that the courts do 
recognize and give effect to. To refuse to take cognizance of con-
troversies over contracts or property just because a religious in-
stitution is one of the parties smacks of a denial of equal protection 
as well as of a violation of first amendment religious rights.44 In 
the leading case of Watson v. ]ones,45 the Court said: "Religious 
organizations come before us in the same attitude as other volun-
tary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their 
rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection 
of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its res-
traints."46 
42 See Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426 (195!1). 
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in School Dist. v. Schempp, in discussing the decisions 
concerning contests for control of a church property and other ecclesiastical disputes, 
said: "This line [of decisions] has settled the proposition that in order to give effect to 
the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government 
a strict neutrality toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide 
such questions." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 24!1 (1963). This statement is 
curious in view of the large number of cases, many of which are cited later in this 
article (including the three decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Justice Brennan 
as authority for his statement: Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Kedroff 
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); and Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 
363 U.S. 190 (1960)) in which the courts have undertaken to decide such questions, often 
with full awareness of the theological character of the question. 
43 The first amendment religious freedoms are protected against state interference 
by the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathe-
dral, supra note 42; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, supra note 42; Zorach v. Clau-
son, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, !110 U.S. 296 
1940); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
44 See generally Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues, 20 
OHIO ST. L.J. 508 (1959); 75 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. II42 (1962); 54 MICH. L. REv. 102 (1955). 
45 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
46 Id. at 714. 
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The Court continued with the observation that fortunately 
these questions could be resolved, as in other cases, by the simple 
application of common legal principles without raising trouble-
some religious or constitutional problems. But this solution may 
not be as simple as it sounds. It can, of course, be argued that the 
exercise of religion depends, in large part, upon the properties 
and "temporalities" held by the religious group. Some sort of 
church edifice is usually required as a place of worship. Chattels 
of numerous forms are required for purposes directly connected 
with worship as well as for purposes connected with the adminis-
tration of the institution's affairs. Employees are needed; money is 
needed both to discharge legal obligations and to be expended for 
charitable uses. In short, the institution can hardly exercise its 
religion without these "temporal" necessities. To the extent that 
the courts do recognize legal rights and duties with respect to 
these "temporalities" and enforce them by their decrees, their acts 
affect the exercise of religion. A judicial decree or judgment in 
favor of the religious institution can aid the exercise of religion; 
a decree or judgment against the institution can inhibit the exer-
cise of religion. But religious freedoms, like the other constitu-
tional freedoms, are guaranteed only so long as their exercise does 
not violate protected rights of others. Property rights and contract 
rights are, or course, protected, and so no violation of the free 
exercise of religion could be said to result when a judge forces a 
religious institution to perform its contractual obligations to out-
siders. Hence, cases in which a religious institution is one of the 
parties do not normally raise religious or constitutional issues. 
But is this true of cases in which both plaintiff and defendant 
claim status as religious institutions? 
It does not necessarily follow that because contract and prop-
erty rights are involved the courts should have general power, free 
from constitutional inhibitions, to adjudicate the rights of reli-
gious institutions. The courts have not distinguished controver-
sies between religious institutions and non-religious institutions, 
where the issue usually is whether one party has a right and the 
other a correlative duty with respect to the contract or property 
in question, from controversies between rival religious groups 
both claiming title to the same contract or property rights. If it 
is a property contest, the courts feel it is subject to judicial cog-
nizance; it matters not that the contest is between two groups 
that want the property for the purposes of aiding their exercise 
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of religion. Of course, if the courts can decide these "temporal" 
controversies without involving any religious issues, the mere fact 
that two religious institutions are the litigants raises no constitu-
tional problems. But as a practical matter, courts are seldom 
asked to decide contests between religious institutions except 
where some basically religious question underlies the temporal 
controversy. Questions as to who should control the church prop-
erties and for what purposes will normally be resolved by tne in-
ternal workings of the church organization unless there is some 
fundamental disagreement. And even fundamental disagreements 
will normally be settled by compromise unless they involve some 
basic questions of religious doctrine concerning which the feelings 
of the rival groups are too strong to allow compromise. Of the 
hundreds of reported contests between rival religious groups over 
church properties, nearly all are, at heart, either controversies over 
the identity of the authoritative decision-making body or over the 
purposes for which the decision-making body can validly use the 
properties consistently with the principles of the institution!7 
These questions are really religious questions. They become legal 
questions only when the law determines that it will support one 
side or the other. Perhaps the courts must decide these cases one 
way or the other in order to preserve the rule of law. But it 
would seem that in doing so they have perhaps unwittingly 
approached the limits of constitutionality. In every such case 
where the schism is precipitated by ideological differences, the 
court, by giving exclusive control of the properties to one 
group, takes sides in a religious dispute-a result which seems 
contrary to the first amendment.48 Its decision on the property 
question must prefer one religious group over another on reli-
gious grounds, and this Mr. Justice Black has said amounts to an 
"establishment" of the prevailing group.49 Likewise, such a de-
47 See authorities cited note 44 supra. 
48 See Mr. Justice Brennan's statement quoted supra note 42. 
49 "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least 
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Mr. Justice Black was speaking, of 
course, abou~ establishment by legislation. In Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 
U.S. 190 (1960), the Court held, with respect to the free exercise clause, that a judicial 
encroachment was as unconstitutional as a legislative one. If this principle applies to 
the establishment clause as well, and no reason appears why it should not, a judicial 
decision preferring one religious group over another must come very near to the outer 
limits of constitutionality as announced by Mr. Justice Black in Everson. 
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cision must impair the free exercise of the losing group, at least 
to some extent.60 And so, despite the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, as expressed by Mr. Justice Miller in Watson v. Jones, that 
contests between rival religious groups can be resolved by simple 
application of common-law doctrines, these controversies actually 
contain some very sensitive constitutional questions, which ought 
to be recognized and dealt with as such.61 
Before the Supreme Court's decision in the now famous Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral cases,62 few of the cases had exhibited any 
awareness of the constitutional implications. This lack of con-
cern is understandable in the earlier state cases, for the religious 
liberties of the first amendment were not thought to be clearly 
applicable to the states until the third decade of this twentieth 
century.113 It is strange that the problem has not received more 
attention, however, since most of the cases have purported to 
follow Watson v. Jones, and the Supreme Court was surely aware 
of it when Watson was decided. The Court there, consistently 
with the view that the solutions to these contests were relatively 
simple, consciously tried to construct a set of principles which 
would limit the permissible scope of judicial action very strictly 
and which would insure that in judging these cases only pure 
questions of law would be decided by the courts. 
B. The Doctrine of Watson v. Jones 
The case of Watson v. Jones was the culmination of an exten-
sive and bitter struggle between two factions of the Walnut Street 
ISO "If state courts are to decide such controversies at all instead of leaving them to 
be settled by a show of force, is it Constitutional to decide for only one side of the 
controversy and unconstitutional to decide for the other? In either case, the religious 
freedom of one side or the other is impaired if the temporal goods they need are with· 
held or taken from them." Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 130-31 
(1952) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.). 
Ill It is only fair to note that the views expressed in the two preceding footnotes on 
the meaning of the establishment and free exercise clauses are not universally accepted 
as final and authoritative. In spite of Pfeffer's whole-hearted endorsement (Pfeffer, supra 
note 8), Mr. Justice Black's famous dictum has been widely attacked as historically un· 
tenable. See, e.g., O'NEILL, R.EucION UNDER THE CoNsrrrunoN (1949); Corwin, The 
Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 I.Aw & CoNTEMl'. PROB. 3 (1949). The 
existence of the views held by these Justices, however, supports the point sought to be 
made, namely, that judicial action in controversies between religious groups comes very 
close to, if it does not exceed, the limits of constitutionality, and accordingly that the 
cases are not so simple as Mr. Justice Miller thought in Watson v. Jones. Mr. Justice 
Brennan's statement, supra note 42, recognizes the problem but does not attempt to 
solve it. 
112 Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas 
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
11s See note 43 supra. 
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Presbyterian Church of Louisville over control of church proper-
ties. The factions had split over the general issue of slavery and 
allied matters, which had also caused a division at the denomina-
tional level in the national Presbyterian Church and in the synod 
of Kentucky. Both factions claimed to be the true Walnut Street 
Presbyterian Church. Jones's faction was recognized as the true 
church by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S.A. (the northern group). Watson's faction was recognized 
by the General Assembly of the "Confederate" Presbyterian 
Church, which had withdrawn from the Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S.A. and set up a new organization. The case was in the 
federal courts by virtue of diversity of citizenship, and the doctrines 
to be applied were, of course, the pre-Erie54 federal common law. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the faction recognized by the 
original General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the 
U.S.A. was the true church and, as such, was entitled to the prop-
erty. In reaching this decision, however, the Court discussed 
generally the question of judicial relief in church property dis-
putes, and announced three principles which have been frequently 
quoted (but less frequently followed than is usually realized) in 
later cases in state courts. In view of the fact that some or all of 
these principles may now have constitutional status by virtue of 
the Saint Nicholas Cathedral cases, it is worthwhile to examine 
them in some detail. 
The Court first divided into three classifications the cases in 
which disputes over property of religious institutions generally 
come before the courts. 
(1) Cases where the property was "devoted to the teaching, 
support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or 
belief" by the express terms of the instrument through which the 
religious institution received the property.55 
(2) Cases where the property is held by a church of congrega-
tional or independent polity which "owes no fealty or obligation 
to any higher authority."56 
(3) Cases where the ecclesiastical body holding the property 
is "a subordinate member of some general church organization in 
which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general 
and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some 
54 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
55 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722 (1871). 
56 Ibid. 
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supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general 
organization."57 In this category would fall disputes over proper-
ties of church of presbyterial or episcopal polity.58 
As to cases of the first type, the Court said, the principles of 
law to be applied in resolving disputes over the use and control of 
such properties are simply the ordinary equitable doctrines relat-
ing to charitable uses. This class of cases, as contemplated by the 
Court, includes only those where some express statement of purpose 
or trust is included in the instrument through which the church 
took title. In such cases the Court can and must intervene to 
prevent the diversion of the property from the trust to which it 
is subjected, so long as there is a possibility of its being used for 
the purposes of its dedication, and so long as there is anyone with 
sufficient standing to challenge the diversion. Apparently either 
a member of the church or an heir of the donor or testator would 
have sufficient standing. In these cases, the Court said, neither the 
majority of the congregation in an independent church nor the 
higher authority in an "associated" church has the power to em-
ploy the property for purposes contrary to those for which it was 
dedicated. "The protection which the law throws around the trust 
is the same."59 It is clear from the Court's discussion that the in-
terest the courts will intervene to protect in these cases is the 
interest of the donor, grantor, or testator who originally subjected 
the property to the trust. Neither the church itself nor individual 
members, nor all the individual members, have any right to use 
the property for purposes inconsistent with the trust. In these 
cases, the Court implies, the solution calls for the simple applica-
tion of trust law principles. The task of determining whether a 
doctrine or practice varies from the objects of the trust may be a 
"delicate one and a difficult one,"60 but the courts must do their 
duty and protect the trust. 
Of course, these statements about the disposition of property 
subject to express trust were dicta. Watson v. Jones was not such 
a case. Neither was it a case of the second type, although the Court 
nevertheless offered its observations concerning the appropriate 
principles for the solution of such cases. 
57 Id. at 722-23. 
1!8 See Note, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. ll42, ll43-44 (1962) for fuller discussion of the three 
basic types of polity and a listing of the major denominations of each form. 
ISO Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 723-24 (1871). 
60 Id. at 724. 
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In cases of the second type the properties have been acquired 
by the independent or congregational church, whether through 
purchase, gift or devise, "with no other specific trust attached to 
it in the hands of the church than that it is for the use of that 
congregation as a religious society."61 "In such cases, where there 
is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting 
bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must 
be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary 
associations."62 If the organization's own rule is that the manner 
of using the property is to be determined by the majority vote of 
members, or by duly elected officers, that determination must be 
accepted as final by the individual members and by the courts. 
Those who object to these uses have no rights in the property as 
individuals and they cannot be permitted to set themselves up as 
the true representatives of the church over the duly authorized 
governing body. 
"This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious 
opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organiza-
tion; for, if such was permitted, a very small minority, with-
out any officers of the church among them, might be found 
to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas of 
the founders of the church. There being no such trust im-
posed upon the property when purchased or given, the court 
will not imply one for the purpose of expelling from its use 
those who by regular succession and order constitute the 
church, because they may have changed in some respect their 
views of religious truths."68 
Here again the Court is trying to show that disputes over 
property of religious institutions of the congregational type must 
be determined by ordinary principles of law applicable alike to 
religious and nonreligious voluntary associations.6t Except for 
property subject to an express trust, the question of which faction 
is to control the property is to be determined by the organization 
itself, under its own rules. The Court should not allow itself to be 
drawn into a controversy over the manner in which the property 
is used, even if one faction claims the other has changed or deviated 
61 Id. at 724•25. 
62 Id. at 725. 
63 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
64 See generally Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAR.v. L. REY. 
983 (1963). 
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from the traditional doctrines "in some respect." If the Court had 
not added this last qualifying phrase-"in some respect"-its 
position on cases of this second type would be clear. The addition 
of that phrase, however, suggests that there may be some other 
respects in which the change in the position taken by the govern-
ing authority within the organization may be such as to warrant 
judicial relief in favor of the minority faction. Later cases, as will 
be shown, have found in that qualifying phrase authority for 
judicial intervention in cases of this second type where there has 
been a fundamental deviation from the original tenets and usages 
of the church-a result Mr. Justice Miller probably would not 
have reached. 
The third class of case is the one actually presented by Watson 
v. ] ones: where the body holding the property is a subordinate 
member of a higher organization. 
"In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should 
govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view 
of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, 
. . . is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, 
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by 
the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter 
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such deci-
sions as final, and binding on them, in their application to 
the case before them. "65 
Thus the courts refuse to decide which faction represents the true 
religion in this kind of case, just as in cases of the second type. 
Which faction is the true one is a question to be decided by the 
higher church judicatory, and that decision is binding upon the 
courts. 
Except, then, for the cases involving an express trust, where 
the case actually concerns the rights of the church vis-a-vis an out-
sider, the donor or grantor, the doctrine of Watson v. Jones de-
mands judicial restraint. Religious questions must be determined 
by the religious group, and this determination normally will 
decide the property questions as well. The Court finds reason for 
this doctrine partly in the constitutional principle of separation 
of church and state,66 partly in the fact that the members who come 
together to form such organizations must contemplate that the 
85 80 U.S. (Ul Wall.) 679, 727 (1871). 
66 Id. at 728. 
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religious group itself will be authoritative on questions of faith, 
dogma or discipline, and partly because religious principles and 
laws are so complex in themselves as to require a tribunal specially 
schooled in such matters-a condition that characterizes religious 
judicatories but not civil courts.67 
The rules announced in Watson v. Jones clearly have as one of 
their purposes the avoidance of religious questions by civil courts. 
But this has not been the result. The rules still leave to the court 
certain essentially religious controversies. 
In cases of the first type, involving an express trust for religious 
purposes, the courts will always have to determine the scope of 
the religious purpose. Theoretically this is a question of the donor's 
or testator's intent, but normally the intent will be couched in 
terms of serving a particular faith or denomination. In such cases 
the court has to determine which uses do and which do not serve 
the purposes of that particular faith or denomination. This, of 
course, is a religious question. 
In cases of the second and third types the religious questions 
that in fact must be answered are less obvious. Since the choice as 
between the second and third rules depends upon whether the 
church is of congregational or "associated" polity, the court initi-
ally may have to decide into which group the church actually 
falls.68 Normally, there is no dispute over this question, but oc-
casionally there is, and the court must then decide this basic 
question of religious doctrine in the face of the contrary contention 
of at least one group.69 
If the body is classified as one of associated polity, the rule of 
Watson v. ] ones requires the court to defer to the decision of the 
proper ecclesiastical judicatory. The group entitled to the use and 
control of the property is the group recognized by the higher 
judicatory. This presupposes that the proper judicatory is readily 
67 Id. at 729. 
68 See Note, 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1142, 1158-60 (1962). 
69 The issue sometimes arises when an independent, congregationally organized body 
becomes affiliated with a denomination that adheres to "associated" or heirarchical polity. 
If the local church later should vote to withdraw, the question is clearly presented. See, 
e.g., Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 74 A.2d 203 (1950); 
Lumbee River Conference of the Holiness Methodist Church v. Locklear, 246 N.C. 349, 
98 S.E.2d 453 (1957). See also Monk v. Little, 122 Ark. 7, 182 S.W. 511 (1916); McAuliffe 
v. Russian Greek Catholic Church, 130 Conn. 521, 36 A.2d 53 (1944); Clay v. Crawford, 
298 Ky. 654, 183 S.W.2d 797 (1944); First Church of the Brethren of Lewistown v. 
Snider, 367 Pa. 78, 79 A.2d 422 (1951); Full Gospel Temple v. Redd, 82 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 
1955); Bunnell v. Creacy, 266 S.W. 98 (Ky. 1954). 
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identifiable. This is not always the case.70 If the dispute within a 
local church actually reflects a schism at a higher level, there may 
be two or more higher authorities claiming ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tion over the local church. One of these may have recognized one 
local group as the true church; the other may have recognized the 
opposing faction. In such a case, in order to apply the rule of 
Watson v. Jones, the court must decide which of the two higher 
judicatories is the proper one. This decision is essentially a reli-
gious question which the court must resolve before it can decide 
the question of which local group gets the property. Watson v. 
Jones itself was such a case, although the Court seemingly did not 
realize that it was. There the general Presbyterian Church had 
divided into Northern and Southern groups, each claiming the 
other had abandoned the true faith. The Court apparently did not 
consider the possibility that the Southern Presbyterian Church 
might have been the proper judicatory, but by this very failure to 
consider alternatives the Court decided that the Northern group 
was the proper judicatory. This decision was essentially one of 
religious doctrine. The Northern Presbyterian Church was recog-
nized as the true, official church; the Southern church was deviant. 
Another such case was Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.71 
In that case the property conflict over control of the Cathedral 
was merely reflective of a doctrinal conflict at a higher level. An 
American group claimed to be the true hierarchy of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in America, to the exclusion of a Russian group. 
The Court, purporting to apply the rule of Watson v. Jones, 
awarded the property to the group recognized by the Russian 
hierarchy. The per curiam opinion in the case gives no indication 
that the Court realized the basically religious nature of the issue 
decided in the Kreshik case, although the question of which church 
was the true church was the only real issue in the case once it was 
determined that the rule of Watson v. Jones was to be applied.72 
If it is determined that the local church is one of congregational 
polity, the dicta in Watson v. ] ones indicates that the right to con-
10 See Note, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. ll42, ll64-66 (1962). 
71 :163 U.S. 190 (1960). 
72 See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 
l (1961). "Especially difficult to comprehend is the compulsory withdrawal of state power 
in favor of 'ecclesiastical government' when the very issue in the case was which of two 
ecclesiastical governments was entitled to make the decision." Id. at 83. See also Brun-
dage v. Deardorf, 55 Fed. 839 (1893); Horsman v. Allen, 129 Cal. 131, 61 Pac. 796 (1900); 
Bouchelle v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 Atl. 100 
(1937). 
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trol the property is in the majority of the congregation unless the 
rules of the church provide otherwise.73 The courts, it was said, 
will not interfere with the decision of the majority concerning 
the uses to which the property may be put unless it is subject to 
an express trust. This dictum has not been followed, however, by 
a majority of courts. Most have been willing to defer to the major-
ity's determination only where the decision does not represent a 
"fundamental deviation from the historic beliefs and tenets of the 
church." Strangely, the courts often claim to be following Watson 
v. Jones in so holding,74 but it is reasonably clear from the Watson 
case that Mr. Justice Miller did not contemplate that the courts 
would become embroiled in questions involving deviations from 
basic tenets except in cases of express trust. The language quoted 
above75 seems to say that no "implied" trust will be found in these 
cases, but the courts have refused to follow this dictum, or at least 
have carved out an exception to it. Herein lies another area in which 
the courts will decide religious questions. Some courts have treated 
the subject in terms of implied trust,76 but others have treated it 
as a limitation on the power of the majority of a congregational 
church, without reference to the trust idea at all.77 Only a few 
courts have followed strictly the principle of majority rule as con-
tained in the Watson dictum.78 
73 In Murrell v. Bentley, 39 Tenn. App. 563, 286 S.W.2d 359 (1954), the laws of the 
local Church of Christ vested the right of control in the Elders. Their right to control 
the church property was upheld against the claim of the majority faction. However, in 
Bentley v. Shanks, 48 Tenn. App. 512, 348 S.W.2d 900 (1960), involving the same church, 
the court upheld the majority's right to excommunicate the Elders as individuals. 
74 See Note, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1142, 1167 (1962). 
15 See text accompanying note 63 supra. 
76 See, e.g., Ashman v. Studebaker, 115 Ind. App. 73, 56 N.E.2d 674 (1944); Park v. 
Chaplin, 96 Iowa 55, 64 N.W. 674 (1895); Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Whitmore, 83 Iowa 
138, 49 N.W. 81 (1891); Hall v. Deskins, 252 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1952); Black v. Tackett, 
237 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1951); Linton v. Flowers, 230 Miss. 838, 94 So. 2d 615 (1957); Mt. 
Helm Baptist Church v. Jones, 79 Miss. 488, 30 So. 714 (1901); Marien v. Evangelical Creed 
Congregation, 132 Wis. 650, 113 N.W. 66 (1907). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R. 105 (1920); 
Annot., 70 A.L.R. 75 (1931); Note 75 HARv. L. REv. 1142, 1167-75 (1962). 
77 See, e.g., Stallings v. Finney, 287 Ill. 145, 122 N.E. 369 (1919); Smith v. Pedigo, 145 
Ind. 361, 33 N.E. 777 (1893); Huber v. Thom, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962); Whipple 
v. Fehsenfeld, 173 Kan. 427, 249 P.2d 638 (1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 813 (1953), re• 
hearing denied, 346 U.S. 918 (1953); Hughes v. Grossman, 166 Kan. 325, 201 P.2d 670 
(1949); Trett v. Lambeth, 195 S.W .2d 524 (Mo. App. 1946); Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 
201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954); Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 64, 138 S.E. 412 (1927); accord, Mitchell 
v. Church of Christ, 221 Ala. 315, 128 So. 781 (1930). 
78 See Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla. 817, 172 So. 89 (1937); Cape v. Moore, 122 Okla. 
229, 253 Pac. 506 (1927); First Baptist Church v. Fort, 93 Tex. 215, 54 S.W. 892 (1900); 
accord, Monk v. Little, 122 Ark. 7, 182 S.W. 511 (1916); Rush v. Yancey, 349 S.W.2d 337 
(Ark. 1961). 
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C. Preservation of Denominational Stability 
In view of the clear intention of Mr. Justice Miller's strong 
dictum in Watson v. J ones19 relating to congregational churches, 
one may wonder why the courts have refused to follow it. Why 
have the courts refused to accept the decision of a congregational 
majority with the same finality as that accorded a decision of a 
hierarchical tribunal of an "associated" denomination? Why is the 
power of a congregational majority to effect basic doctrinal changes 
limited when that of a hierarchy seemingly is not? Why is prop-
erty given to a congregational church subject to an "implied trust" 
while that given to a member church of an "associated" or hier-
archical denomination is not?80 
The courts recognize the need for protecting the reliance of 
those members of the congregation who, over the years, may con-
tribute to the support of \he church without any express reserva-
tion and without subjecting their donations to any express trust. 
These people presumably believe in the basic doctrines and usages 
of the church or they would not support it. It seems somehow un-
fair for a religious institution to obtain money from people by 
holding itself out as an institution thoroughly dedicated to the 
propagation of some identifiable set of doctrines or beliefs and 
then to abandon them. A secular institution's actions would be 
scrutinized very carefully by a court if it attempted to do this, 
and it might well be estopped from making basic changes after 
holding itself out for a long period. An ecclesiastical institu-
tion should be held to a standard of fair dealing at least as high as 
that imposed upon non-religious institutions. This argument may 
perhaps explain why congregational majorities are deterred from 
effecting fundamental changes. It does not, however, explain why 
there should be a distinction between congregational churches and 
"associated" churches in this regard. Individual members of hier-
archical churches are just as likely to be tithers; they are just as 
79 See text accompanying note 63 supra. 
so The argument that the action of the higher church authority itself amounts to 
a deviation has occasionally been argued-usually without success. See, e.g., Bouchelle 
v. Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation, 22 Del. Ch. 58, 194 Atl. 100 (1937); First 
Protestant Reformed Church v. De Wolf, 344 Mich. 624, 75 N.W.2d 19 (1956); Kelly v. 
McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 Atl. 736 (1938). The argument was successful in the 
courts of two states in cases arising out of the merger of the Cumberland Presbyterian 
Church and the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. Boyles v. Roberts, 
222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909) (later disapproved in Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 
172 S.W. 897 (1914)); Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S.W. 169 (1911); Landrith 
v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1908). 
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likely to rely on the continued acceptance of basic doctrines. It is 
no answer to say that members of hierarchical churches contribute 
with full awareness that the use of the church property is subject 
to the direction of higher church authorities. Members of con-
gregational churches could equally be said to contribute with full 
awareness of the power of the majority to control the uses to 
which the church property is to be put. 81 
A key to the answer may be found by examining the kinds of 
deviations the courts have found to be "fundamental" in cases in 
which congregational majorities have been prevented from using 
church properties. Such an examination would show that in most 
of the cases where the decision of the congregational majority has 
been held a violation of "implied trust" or outside the majority's 
powers there has been an attempt to alter in some serious way the 
connection between the local church and other churches in some 
larger organization.82 In most cases the action of the majority held 
to be a fundamental deviation is an attempt to abandon the de-
nominational affiliation, to change from one denomination to 
another, or to affiliate a non-denominational church with a denom-
ination. Changes in doctrines and practices other than this are 
usually held not to be so fundamental as to warrant judicial inter-
ference. 83 There are some exceptions, but in general the courts 
intervene only in order to protect what might be called the "de-
nominational stability" of the church. In spite of the fact that the 
courts commonly express the principle in terms of preventing 
doctrinal changes, the real, operative principle seems to be one of 
preventing institutional change. 
81 This argument was suggested by the Supreme Court itself, referring to churches 
of associated polity, but using language susceptible of application to congregational 
churches: "The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expres-
sion and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision 
of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical gov-
ernment of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general 
association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an 
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it." 'Watson v. Jones, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728, 729 (1871), quoted in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 
344 U.S. 94 at 114 (1952). 
82 This is a generalization based upon an examination of over 200 cases. It is im-
possible to cite them all here. A more detailed treatment of these cases is planned as 
the subject of another article to appear later in another publication. 
83 Of thirty-four cases examined in which the action of the majority claimed to be 
a fundamental deviation was something other than an attempt to alter the denomina-
tional connection, the court in fact held against the majority in only two cases: Jackson 
v. Jones, 130 Kan. 488, 287 Pac. 603 (1930); and Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 
S.W.2d 361 (1943). Neither of these is a strong authority against the proposition made 
in the text, owing to certain procedural and factual peculiarities. 
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Perhaps the reliance factor mentioned above is a sufficient 
reason to justify judicial interference to protect the denomina-
tional connection. Of course, any judicial action at all raises con-
stitutional problems, but so would a total refusal of judicial 
protection.84 If the courts are to interfere at all, it is perhaps easier 
to justify interference to protect reliance and denominational 
stability than to protect the right to change, at least in the light of 
existing law. Probably the courts should stop talking about pre-
venting doctrinal deviations and enforcing implied trusts. Promot-
ing denominational stability is about as far as they have to go to 
protect reliance. If the individual members rely on anything in 
giving their money to the church without reservations, they prob-
ably rely upon the continuance of the denominational connection 
rather than upon particular tenets or usages. Moreover, the de-
nominational organization itself and its other member churches 
may have an interest in the defecting church's denominational 
stability that should be considered, but which is seldom given 
attention under the implied trust-fundamental deviation analysis. 
If judicial interference is placed on the basis of preventing 
institutional changes that disturb denominational stability, rather 
than upon preventing doctrinal deviations, it becomes easier to 
reconcile such court action with the first amendment, and easier 
to explain the courts' comparative willingness to interfere in the 
case of congregational churches and unwillingness in the case of 
"associated" churches. In the normal case denominational stability 
can be preserved by accepting the decision of the hierarchical tri-
bunal. Except in cases where there is a question whether the de-
nomination is one of "associated" polity or not, or cases where there 
are competing hierarchies, there is little justification for judicial 
interference in the actions of hierarchical, or "associated," 
churches. The judicatory tribunal being a denominational instead 
of a local institution, can be depended upon to preserve denomina-
tional stability. 
The situation of congregational churches, however, is different. 
The majority of a congregational church may want to avoid 
denominational influence. There is not the same assurance that 
their decisions will preserve denominational stability. Moreover, 
there are some inherent characteristics of the congregational major-
ity that prevent it from being a really satisfactory tribunal accord-
84 See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra. 
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ing to standards the courts are familiar with. Congregational polity 
is based upon the belief that God's will is apprehended through 
the collective wills of a majority of the members of the local 
church. The courts, however, have not accepted this as a legal 
principle. They have recognized that congregations often act in 
important matters under the influence of passion rather than 
reason,85 and so have tended to suspect decisions of majorities 
where evidence of unreason was present.86 To a true congregation-
alist the fact that decisions are not always based on reason is not a 
serious flaw in the system of majority rule, but to the courts it 
apparently is. The courts are accustomed to reviewing the acts of 
legislatures to insure that a passionate majority will take no steps 
inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of the political body-
the Constitution. Perhaps they feel the same sort of necessity to 
review the acts of ecclesiastical bodies. 
But apart from the fact that decisions of such bodies frequently 
are irrational, the local church congregation has at least two other 
defects which prevent it from being a really satisfactory judicatory 
tribunal. Unlike law courts or even ecclesiastical tribunals within 
associated churches, there is a relatively rapid turnover of mem-
bership within churches. Members come and go as they move into 
and out of the geographical area the church serves. Moreover, the 
number of members is never fixed as it is in the case of judicial or 
hierarchical tribunals. It can go up or down as new members are 
added or removed from the rolls of the church. Accordingly, the 
"majority" of a congregational church is necessarily a very ephem-
eral concept; the group of individuals that comprises the congrega-
tion varies over relatively short periods of time as to both identity 
and number of individuals. Because there are no specific restric-
tions as to the identity or numbers of the persons comprising the 
congregation, its composition may be subject to manipulation. 
The cases frequently contain charges asserted by one faction that 
the other has packed the congregation by bringing in new mem-
bers known to be sympathetic to its viewpoint.87 There are also 
many instances in which the majority faction has tried (occasionally 
85 See, e.g., Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943). 
86 The tenor of the court's opinion in Huber v. Thom, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 
(1962) (see text accompanying note 26 supra), suggests that it may have felt the majority 
was acting from motives other than reason. 
87 See, e.g., Ginossi v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123 N.E.2d 104 (1954). 
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with success) to achieve its ends by simply excommunicating the 
minority.88 
The cases often speak of the congregational "majority" as 
though it were an easily identifiable group of people, equivalent 
in all legal respects to a hierarchical tribunal. This tendency could 
be avoided if the courts would recognize that the "majority" is 
inevitably a "temporary majority." It might help, in fact, if the 
courts would expressly refer to it as the "temporary majority." 
In addition to the fluctuating composition of the congregation, 
the members themselves may or may not be well-schooled in the 
basic religious doctrines of the denomination. The tribunals of 
"associated" churches commonly are composed of trained ministers 
or highly educated laymen. The same cannot always be said of 
the "temporary majority" of a congregational church. Thus, the 
majority's decision may not only reflect manipulation of member-
ship and passion in place of reason; it may also be based upon 
erroneous notions of the denominational position on particular 
issues. In the light of all these factors, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the courts have been unwilling to accept the decision of the 
congregational temporary majority as authoritative when it pro-
duces radical changes in doctrine, or at least in denominational 
affiliation. 
The term "denominational stability" that has been employed 
here must be interpreted liberally. It is sometimes difficult to tell 
whether a congregationally organized church is affiliated with a 
"denomination" or merely with a loose "voluntary association." 
The distinction between the two concepts is seldom defined and 
is far from clear, but it is obvious from the cases that two different 
types of organizational connection must be recognized. If the or-
ganization is classified by the court as a "denomination" the con-
nection usually cannot be terminated by a vote of the majority of 
88 See, e.g., Rush v. Yancey, !149 S.W .2d 337 (Ark. 1961); Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla. 
817, 172 So. 89 (19!!7); First Regular Baptist Church v. Allison, !104 Pa. I, 154 Atl. 913 
(1931); Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. !lO!l, 18 S.W. 874 (1892); First Baptist Church of Red• 
land v. Ward, 290 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). In Trustees of Oak Grove Missionary 
Baptist Church v. Ward, 261 Ky. 42, 86 S.W.2d 1051 (1935), the minority of seven mem• 
hers claimed to have excommunicated the majority of sixty-three members. The court 
held that in a congregational church it was impossible for a minority to excommunicate 
a majority, since the majority controls the church. However, in Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 
64, 1!18 S.E. 412 (1927), the court seemingly approved the right of a minority faction to 
excommunicate the majority. In Bentley v. Shanks, 48 Tenn. App. 512, 348 S.W.2d 900 
(1960), the majority of the congregation was able to avoid the church law vesting con• 
trol in designated elders by simply excommunicating the men who held positions as 
elders. 
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the members of the local church. If it is classified as a "voluntary 
association," the majority of the congregation is usually allowed 
to abandon the association if it elects to do so.89 Probably the dif-
ference between the two is referable to the degree to which con-
tinued membership in the organization is likely to be relied upon 
by the individual members in making their contributions. Subtle 
theological conceptions of church polity are frequently meaning-
less to individual members of churches. An individual member of 
a local congregational church is likely to "denominate" himself as 
a Baptist or a Quaker, and this sort of "denomination," to him, is 
the same as a member of Saint Paul's Episcopal Church calling 
himself an Episcopalian. In spite of the church's official adherence 
to congregational principles of polity, the individual member of 
a Baptist church tends to think of himself primarily as a Baptist 
and secondarily as a member of the Third Street Baptist Church. 
His loyalty, in the absence of a change of heart, is likely to be as 
much to a larger organization of Baptists as to the local church. 
But how can one tell which larger organization of Baptists is a 
"denominational" organization and which is not? The Third 
Street Baptist Church may be one of several churches that to-
gether form the Sewanee River Association of Baptist Churches. 
It may also be affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention. 
Are these larger organizations "denominations"? The Sewanee 
River Association surely should not be considered a denomination, 
not even when viewed, as suggested here, through the eyes of the 
individual member. His connection with the Sewanee River 
Association most likely derives from and is dependent upon his 
membership in the local church. His relation to the Southern 
Baptist Convention, however, may be quite different. His loyalty 
to the Southern Baptist Convention may well be prior to and 
independent of his membership in the local church. It is difficult 
to generalize, of course, but in most instances it seems more prob-
able that the individual is connected with the local church because 
the church is affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention than 
so See Montgomery v. Snyder, 320 S.W .2d 283 (Mo. App. 1958). See also Caples v. 
Nazareth Church of Hopewell Ass'n, 245 Ala. 656, 18 So. 2d 383 (1944); Wright v. Smith, 
4 Ill. App. 2d 470, 124 N.E.2d 363 (1955); Little Grove Church v. Todd, 373 Ill. 387, 26 
N.E.2d 485 (1940); Ragsdale v. Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952); 
Keith v. First Baptist Church, 243 Iowa 616, 50 N.W.2d 803 (1952); Scott v. Turner, 275 
S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1954); Roel<. Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. 
Mommsen, 174 Minn. 207, 219 N.W 88 (1928); Windley v. McCliney, 163 N.C. 318, 77 
S.E. 266 (1913); Cape v. Moore, 122 Okla. 229, 253 Pac. 506 (1927). 
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that the individual is connected with the Southern Baptist Con-
vention because he is a member of the local church. It would not 
be inappropriate, under such circumstances, to consider the South-
ern Baptist Convention a denomination, entitled to a relatively 
stable membership of local churches, in roughly the same sense as 
the Presbyterian or Methodist or Episcopal denominations. 
Since reliance of the members seems to be the primary justifi-
cation for judicial interference in church property dispute cases, 
it is reasonable for the courts to consider the question of whether 
a local church is a member of a denomination from the standpoint 
of the actual understanding of the average individual member 
rather than from the standpoint of technical theological principles 
of polity. This leads to a somewhat subjective standard of what 
kinds of organizational connection are "denominational," but it is 
probably better than no standard at all. It must be acknowledged 
that the courts have not employed this standard. Probably the 
courts have simply tended to use the term "denomination" to 
denote connections that the majority cannot terminate and the 
term "voluntary association" those that it can. Different courts 
have classified the same kind of associational connection differently. 
In Kansas and North Carolina, for instance, the American and 
Southern Baptist Conventions are regarded as denominations.00 
In Texas and Wisconsin they are treated as voluntary associa-
tions.91 In Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota, the Missouri 
Synod Lutheran Church may be regarded as a denomination;92 in 
Iowa, Missouri, and Wisconsin it is not.93 
D. Alternative Solutions to Religious Property Disputes: 
Partition and Divided Use 
In view of the objections that can be raised to intervention by 
the courts in religious disputes, one may well ask why the courts 
do not simply try to divide the property between the rival factions 
in some way. A few cases have arrived at solutions based upon 
90 See Huber v. Thorn, 189 Kan. 631, 371 P.2d 143 (1962); Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 
201, 85 S.E.2d ll4 (1954). 
91 See First Baptist Church v. Dennis, 253 S.W .2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Ander-
son v. Byers, 269 Wis. 93, 69 N.W .2d 227 (1955). See also Beard v. Francis, 43 Tenn. App. 
513, 309 S.W.2d 788 (1957). · · 
92 See Blauert v. Schupmann, 241 Minn. 428, 63 N.W.2d 578 (1954); Geiss v. Trinity 
Lutheran Church Congregation, II9 Neb. 745, 230 N.W. 658 (1930); Bendewald v. Ley, 
39 N.D. 272, 168 N.W. 693 (1917). · 
93 See Dressen v. Brahmeier, 56 Iowa 756, 9 N.W. 193 (1881); Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271 
S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1954); Ruhbush v. Buss, 184 Wis. 439, 198 N.W •. 608 (1924). 
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division of the property. The leading case is Ferraria v. Vascon-
cellos.94 In that case the members of a local Presbyterian church 
voted, 105 to 101, to withdraw from the Presbytery to which it 
had belonged. The minority refused to abide by the decision, 
whereupon the majority denied the minority the right to use the 
property. The minority sued to recover the use of the property, 
claiming that a local Presbyterian church could not withdraw 
from the Presbytery, and that in attempting to do so the majority 
had forfeited its right to use the property. The defendant majority 
claimed that, as the majority of the congregation, it had power to 
determine how the property was to be used, and that since it had 
decided to withdraw from the Presbytery, the minority had no 
right to use the property in a contrary manner. Although both 
factions claimed the right to all the property to the exclusion of 
the other faction, the court held that the proper solution was to 
sell the church property and to divide the proceeds proportion-
ately. The court said that every member of the congregation had 
an equal interest in the church property, and that one faction 
could not be allowed to deprive the other of that interest. The 
court noted that this was the most equitable result where the 
factions are almost equal in numbers, but that it might not be if 
the proportions were different. 
The decision was followed a short time later in Nicolls v. 
Rugg,95 a case involving similar facts, except that the ratio between 
the majority and the minority was two to one (129 to 63), instead 
of being almost of equal proportions.96 
The doctrine of the Ferraria case was rejected in Dressen v. 
Brahmeier,Sl1 where the Iowa court held that the rule could not 
apply to an incorporated church. In Immanuel's Gemeinde v. 
Keil,98 however, the Kansas court upheld the solution of sale and 
partition of the proceeds, expressly rejecting the argument that 
it did not apply to incorporated churches. In 1910, the Illinois 
court itself, in the case of German Evangelical Congregation v. 
Deutsche Gemeinde,99 effectively rejected the rule of the Ferraria 
case: saying that in the Ferraria and Nicolls cases the court had 
94 31 Ill. 25 (1863). 
95 47 Ill. 47 (1868). 
96 It is worth noting that both cases were decided before Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
97 56 Iowa 756, 9 N.W. 193 (1881). 
98 61 Kan. 65, 58 Pac. 973 (1899). 
99 246 Ill. 328, 92 N.E. 868 (1910). 
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reached the utter extreme of its equitable powers, and that the 
remedy of partition was not to be allowed at all in the case of an 
incorporated church, and in the case of an unincorporated church 
only where there was nearly an equal division of the congregation. 
The Ferraria doctrine rests upon the premise that individual 
members of the congregation have some sort of protectable inter-
est in the church property. Otherwise there would be little 
justification for proportionate division. This idea has no support 
in religious doctrine, and has been subjected to stern criticism in 
some cases which have totally rejected the concept of partition.100 
In spite of the logical difficulties posed by proportionate division, 
however, where the factions voluntarily agree to such a partition 
as a method of avoiding litigation, the agreement is normally 
upheld.101 
Another solution which attempts to accommodate the property 
interests of both factions is that of allowing both factions to use 
the property alternately. This solution has been embodied in a 
statute in Kentucky.102 It was applied without benefit of statutory 
authorization in an Oklahoma case.103 There are obvious draw-
backs to this approach. If the factions are so far apart on ideologi-
cal grounds that they cannot resolve their differences without 
schism, it is unlikely that an arrangement for the sharing of 
facilities would prove acceptable for very long. If the court orders 
this common use of the church property an unstable situation is 
perpetuated which neither party really wants. Cases are rare in 
which this solution has been applied, and even in Kentucky, where 
it is expressly authorized by statute, the courts have held that the 
statutory solution of alternate or divided use is only a temporary 
measure, to be applied only until it can be determined which of 
the factions is the one entitled to all of the property.104 The statute 
does not apply at all to congregational churches, according to the 
recent decisions.105 
100 Cf. Le Blanc v. Lemaire, 105 La. 539, 30 So. 135 (1901); Schradi v. Dornfeld, 52 
Minn. 465, 55 N.W. 49 (1893). 
101 Bogard v. Boone, 200 Ky. 572, 255 S.W. 112 (1923); Lost River Norwegian Evan-
gelical Lutheran Congregation v. Thoen, 149 Minn. 379, 183 N.W. 954 (1921); accord, 
Wicks v. Nedrow, 28 Neb. 387, 44 N.W. 457 (1889). 
102 "In case of a division in a religious society, the trustees shall permit each party 
to use the church and property for divine worship a part of the time, proportioned to 
the members of each party •••. " KY. REv. STAT. § 273.120 (1955). 
103 Huffhines v. Sheriff, 65 Okla. 90, 162 Pac. 491 (1916). 
104' Jones v. Johnson, 295· Ky. 707, 175 S.W.2d 370 (1943). 
105 Fleming v. Rife, 328 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. 1954); Bunnell v. Creacy, 266 S.W.2d 98 
(Ky. 1954). 
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The cases involving judicial division of the property between 
the factions-either by sale and division of proceeds, or by al-
ternate use-are few and for the most part old.106 In the great 
majority of the cases the courts have felt it necessary to rule that 
the property belonged exclusively to one faction or the other. 
E. Protecting the Status Quo 
Because the courts will not review religious disputes except 
when presented in a property context, and because the principal 
underlying justification for judicial interference is the protection 
of reliance and denominational stability, when a court does over-
rule the decision of the ecclesiastical authority, it inevitably does 
so in the interest of preserving the status quo. The policy of the 
law, as it is reflected in the cases, is against innovation and change 
in the denominational structure of the institution and perhaps in 
the basic doctrines. In view of this, even duly constituted authori-
ties of the church cannot, in the face of opposition, feel safe in 
devoting church property to radically new uses. The free exercise 
of new religious views may be inhibited by the fear of forfeiture 
of the properties of the church. Of course, it is not a function of 
the law to see that persons or groups are always free to exercise their 
religion without fear or sacrifice. In this situation, however, the 
sacrifice is imposed by the law-by the state. Judicial enforcement 
of the rule against fundamental deviation from basic doctrines is 
just as much state action as is judicial enforcement of restrictive 
racial covenants in deeds. The state thus takes an active part in 
inhibiting basic innovations by interposing its authority in favor 
of the status quo. 
It is difficult to see how this result can be reconciled with the 
principle of free exercise of religion. Even if it be granted that 
"free exercise" is a privilege of individuals, not of organizations,1°7 
the anomaly remains, for the individual members of the group 
favoring change normally have contributed money and property 
to the church, just as have those who oppose change. Their right 
to have the "temporalities" of their church applied to the uses 
they consider proper in the exercise of religion should be as strong 
as that of those individuals who oppose the change. 
106 See cases cited notes 94-103 supra. 
lOT See Cahn, The "Establishment of Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1274 (1961), 
for discussion of the problems of constitutional interpretation stemming from the dif• 
ferences between an individual and an institutional acception of "religion" in the first 
amendment. 
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If the courts must decide these cases, and if partition or alter-
nate use are not feasible solutions, there appears to be no way out 
of the dilemma. The court simply has to favor one side or the 
other. The choice of either side will have the effect of impairing 
to some extent the other's freedom of exercise of religion. Both 
sides can make plausible claims of reliance. The side favoring the 
change could argue reliance upon the power of the institution by 
its own internal rules to change with changing times. The side 
opposing change can argue reliance upon the status quo. The 
courts must choose one side or the other. The choice has been to 
prefer the status quo. 
How do these judicial doctrines, derived from the property 
dispute cases, bear upon the denominational mergers that are likely 
to be effected as the ecumenical movement advances? Every at-
tempted merger can be challenged in the courts in the form of a 
property dispute. If the denomination in question is one that 
follows hierarchical principles of polity, the issue can be raised 
when a local church seeks to avoid affiliation with the new merged 
denomination or when a denominational group claims to have 
acceded to authority in the denomination when the old hierarchy 
decided to merge, thus giving up the denomination's distinctive-
ness. The courts may have to decide which hierarchy is the true one 
in order to determine which group is entitled to control the prop-
erty. If this decision depends upon which group has the strongest 
doctrinal connection with the old denomination, the group seek-
ing to avoid the merger will probably be preferred. If the decision 
depends upon which group has the strongest institutional connec-
tion, the decision may well go for the new merged denomination. 
If the denomination is one that follows congregational polity, 
the merger can be challenged when the local church majority 
votes to remain aloof from the merged denomination. Under ex-
isting legal doctrines, the decision will depend upon whether the 
merger constitutes a fundamental deviation from the historic 
principles of the denomination. If it does, the local church need 
not go along. The issue can also be raised by a group claiming 
power over denominational properties after the regular denomina-
tional authorities decide to merge, the theory being that by merg-
ing with another denomination the regular authorities have ef-
fected a fundamental deviation and have abandoned the original 
denomination which alone has power to control the property. 
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F. Mergers Under Religious Corporation Statutes 
Several states have statutes dealing specifically with mergers of 
religious institutions.108 Usually these apply only to incorporated 
religious institutions, although in a few states there are statutes 
that deal specifically with unincorporated groups.109 For the most 
part these statutes are not specifically limited to mergers of local 
churches, but most of them do not really fit the situation of de-
nominational mergers. Those that do apply to denominational 
mergers do not deal with the perplexing problem of what is to 
become of the properties of individual local churches whose mem-
bers may not unanimously favor the merger. 
In any event, these merger statutes probably have little effect 
on the problem of whether the property of the organization will 
go to the merged institution or remain with a group that desires 
to remain aloof.U0 Even if provisions of the statutes purport to vest 
the property of the older institutions in the new one formed by 
the merger, the provisions probably will have no binding effect if 
the merger is regarded as a fundamental change. Examples can be 
found in the cases of attempts to change the character or funda-
mental beliefs of the institution by incorporating, re-incorporating, 
or altering the charter. These attempts are seldom if ever success-
ful.m The "corporation" of a religious institution has no rights to 
the property except those of the "society" from which it was 
formed. The corporation may have title to the property, but that 
does not mean that the corporation's officers are free to determine 
the uses to which the property may be put. The properties can be 
used only for uses sanctioned by the denominational hierarchy or 
10s Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have statutes 
specifically dealing with mergers or consolidations of religious institutions. In several 
other states religious mergers are covered by the general charitable or non-profit cor• 
poration statutes. 
109 Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have statutes applying to some types 
of religious groups. Under several others, unincorporated groups conceivably could 
officially merge by forming one corporation from the two or more unincorporated 
societies. 
110 Cf. Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc'y v. Kenyon, 197 Misc. 124, 95 N.Y.S.2d 
133 (Sup. Ct. 1950), Tev'd, 279 App. Div. 1015, 111 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1952), afj'd, !106 N.Y. 
151, 116 N.E.2d 481 (1953). 
111 See Bomar v. Mount Olive Missionary Baptist Church, 92 Cal. App. 618, 268 Pac. 
665 (1928); Jackson v. Jones, 130 Kan. 488, 287 Pac. 603 (1930); Michigan Congregational 
Conference v. United Church of Scranton, 330 Mich. 561, 48 N.W.2d 108 (1951); Calvary 
Baptist Church v. Shay, 292 Mich. 517, 290 N.W. 890 (1940); cf. Holm v. Holm, 81 Wis. 
374, 51 N.W. 579 (1892). 
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for those (in the case of congregational churches) that do not 
constitute a fundamental deviation in most states.112 The fact that 
the corporation is allowed by statute to merge with another does 
not mean that the merger will also carry the properties of the 
societies to the new merged corporation. 
It is necessary to distinguish three different entities, each of 
which may exist in one ecclesiastical body. The constituency of 
each may be different from that of the others. Zollman has defined 
two of these entities in these terms: 
"In order effectually to disseminate Christian truths, educate 
men in Christian principles, and spread Christianity effec-
tively, the church must have a secular as well as a spiritual 
vitality. An unincorporated church, so called, if it has any 
interest in property at all, therefore, presents a twofold as-
pect. It has a body, the society, with which courts can deal, 
and a soul, with which courts cannot deal. The church is the 
spiritual entity with spiritual sanctions and spiritual bonds of 
union. . . . The society is the temporal body with temporal 
understandings and temporal articles of association. The 
church is subject to spiritual censure; the society is subject 
to the temporal powers. The object of the church is the wor-
ship of God; the object of the society is the 'acquisition and 
management of property.' "113 
As an unincorporated church "presents a twofold aspect," an 
incorporated one presents a threefold aspect. Besides the "church" 
and the "society," as defined by Zollman, there is the corporation, 
which is not necessarily the same as the society. The function of the 
corporation is to serve as the jural entity through which the society 
acts in matters related to its properties. 
Of these three entities it is the church (or its individual con-
stituents) that has the protectable constitutional freedoms of reli-
gious exercise; it is the society that has the beneficial interest in 
the "temporalities." The corporation is only the formal coat that 
the church or society puts on whenever it needs recognized status 
to perform certain effective jural acts: namely, to contract; to con-
vey or receive property; to sue or be sued. Depending upon the 
type of church polity, the denominational organization, and the 
type of corporation statute, the constituencies of the three entities 
112 See, e.g., Lindstrom v. Tell, 1!11 Minn. 20!1, 154 N.W. 969 (1915); Presbytery of 
Bismark v. Allen, 74 N.D. 400, 22 N.W.2d 625 (1946). 
118 ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 14!1 (19!1!1). 
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may be identical or radically different. They serve three different 
functions, and their constituencies are not necessarily the same. 
Accordingly, the statutes dealing with incorporation, merger, 
consolidation, dissolution, amendment of charters, extinction of 
churches, etc., do not determine the property problems that will 
be presented when denominations seek to become reunited.m 
The fact that the general merger statutes usually are not re-
garded as conclusive in questions of property division does not 
mean that statutes could not have conclusive effect. If the courts 
can prescribe, as a matter of common law, the basis for allocating 
the properties, it is difficult to see any reason why the legislature 
should not be able to prescribe the basis by statute. There is an 
indication in a recent Supreme Court case, however, that neither 
state common law nor state statute law may be conclusive on the 
question of the distribution of property in schism cases-and every 
merger that is opposed will present a schism case. The subject may 
now be a matter of federal constitutional law. 
That case is Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.1115 In a con-
test between rival hierarchies over the cathedral properties of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in New York, the New York state 
courts had held for the group which had been formed in America 
after the Soviet revolution drove the church underground in 
Russia as against the reconstituted Russian hierarchy, appointed 
after World War II. In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court 
reversed in favor of the Russian group, holding that, under the 
doctrine of Watson v. Jones, New York had to abide by the ruling 
of the duly constituted hierarchical authority, which the Court 
said was the Russian group. From the brief per curiam opinion it 
seems apparent that the Court did not consider two very important 
questions raised by the case. The first of these is, why should New 
York be bound to follow the rule of Watson v. Jones? That deci-
sion, it will be recalled, although a decision of the United States 
Supreme Court, did not purport to be based upon constitutional 
principles, but upon pre-Erie federal common law. The second 
point is, granting that Watson v. Jones should apply, why should 
the United States Supreme Court's view as to which of the two 
114 Some states (e.g., Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, New York) have very com-
prehensive statutes dealing with all temporal activities of religious institutions; fre-
quently they purport to regulate denominational affiliation by separate statutes for each 
of several different denominations. The effectiveness of such statutes for purposes other 
than the purely formal aspects of jural existence is questionable. 
115 363 U.S. 190 (1960). 
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rival hierarchies represented the true church prevail over the 
decision of the New York court? Actually, the only real question 
in the case was, which group represented the true church and 
which was schismatic? The Court held, without discussion of the 
point, that the Russian group was necessarily the true church, 
and refused to let New York's decision to the contrary stand. 
The Kreshik ruling determined that the New York decision 
violated the Russian group's freedom of exercise of religion. There 
is no consideration of the question whether the decision of the 
Supreme Court itself did not violate the freedom of exercise of 
the American group. It has been pointed out previously that the 
decision of these church property contests by resort to "religious" 
issues poses an almost irreconcilable dilemma: a decision in favor 
of one group over the other on the ground that the favored group 
represents the "true church" necessarily impairs the freedom of 
exercise of the disappointed group and could be said to constitute 
a pro tanto establishment of the favored group as the officially 
sanctioned church.116 In view of the fact that any decision at all 
involves impairment of free exercise of someone, it might be 
thought that the states should be free to make this decision upon 
any reasonable basis-whether prescribing the result by statute 
or deriving it by judicial decision. There is no logical necessity 
for favoring the group with the closest historical organizational 
connection to the original group in order to serve the interests of 
"freedom of exercise" generally; yet this was apparently the ration-
ale of the Kreshik decision. Nevertheless, it seems clear, after the 
Kreshik case, that states are not entirely free to adopt their own 
bases for deciding these cases. Statutes or state judicial decisions 
providing for distribution to the newer group in a case such as 
Kreshik would now seem to violate the first amendment's protec-
tion as applied to the states through the fourteenth. Thus, even if 
the merger and consolidation statutes in the states were clearly 
intended to be conclusive on matters related to the distribution of 
properties, they could be effective for this purpose only if their 
provisions were consistent with the Kreshik and Watson cases. 
Of course, the full meaning of the Kreshik case is far from 
certain. Mr. Justice Brennan's statement in School District v. 
Schempp111 that the Kreshik case "reaffirmed" the proposition that 
116 See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra. 
117 Quoted supra note 42. 
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the courts should not undertake to decide theological questions 
in church property dispute cases does not clarify the meaning of 
the case, since the Supreme Court itself in the Kreshik case did 
precisely that: it decided the theological question of choosing the 
proper hierarchy. Moreover, the opinion in the case was per 
curiam, and that fact deprives it of some of its force. For another 
thing, the Court probably did not need to rule that New York 
must award the property according to the doctrine of Watson v. 
Jones. The New York court seemed to be especially concerned 
about the political implications of deciding for the Russian group. 
The Supreme Court might have reversed the New York decision 
on the ground that political considerations do not provide a suit-
able basis for making a property decision as between two conflict-
ing religious groups, without assuming to dictate the precise basis 
on which the property must be awarded. But even if the case does 
give Watson v. Jones constitutional status, there is still another 
element of uncertainty. That is whether all of what has come to 
be considered as the doctrine of Watson v. Jones now has constitu-
tional status, or whether only the actual holding of the case has 
that status. The doctrine of Watson v. Jones, as it has been dis-
cussed in legal literature and in the cases, is usually understood 
to include all three of the points made in Justice Miller's opin-
ion.118 His observations on two of these points, of course, was 
dictum. The Watson case, like the Kreshik case, actually involved 
a contest between two competing hierarchies. The decision was 
that the local church's property should go to the local group 
sanctioned by the appropriate hierarchy, and the hierarchy with 
the closest organizational connection to the original, traditional, 
historic denominational authority was held to be the appropriate 
hierarchy. The Kreshik case is within the scope of the holding of 
Watson v. Jones. The question at once arises: will the court hold 
that aspect of the Watson doctrine dealing with property of con-
gregationally organized churches to be likewise, now, a principle 
of constitutional law? If this be true, a further question must be 
answered. Does the constitutional principle with respect to con-
gregational churches which derives from Watson v. Jones include 
only the principle of strict majority rule (which we have previously 
herein assumed to be Mr. Justice Miller's real intention) or does it 
include as well the "implied trust-fundamental deviation" excep-
118 See text accompanying notes 55-65 supra. 
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tion which most states have grafted onto it? If the former is true, 
the doctrines presently applied in most states with respect to 
properties of congregational churches are unconstitutional. If the 
latter is true, the court is exposing itself to a potentially immense 
mass of litigation as the ecumenical movement advances. The 
decisions of the state supreme courts will no longer be final: the 
United States Supreme Court may always have the last say on the 
religious question of which view represented by the contesting 
groups corresponds most closely to the fundamental tenets of the 
church, unless the question is limited, as has been suggested above, 
to the protection of denominational stability. 
Apart from these uncertainties there remains the suspicion 
that by taking upon itself the duty to decide these essentially 
religious questions, the Supreme Court has itself brought about 
the "establishment of religion." It has been shown previously that 
judicial action favoring one party in these cases probably must be 
recognized as establishing the doctrinal view of the prevailing 
party, under recent decisions of the Court defining establish-
ment.110 Action of the Supreme Court is judicial action just as is 
action of state courts. True, the first amendment applies in terms 
only to congregational action, but it has been held to apply to the 
states through the fourteenth, and to prohibit both state legislative 
and judicial action. If it does not apply to the United States 
Supreme Court that court will be the only governmental agency 
in the country not subject to the first amendment's restrictions. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In light of the uncertainties noted, what can be said of the law 
relating to mergers of religious institutions? 
Existing state statutes relating to religious corporations, includ-
ing the merger statutes, will have very little effect upon the merger 
movement. They deal only with formalities; they really concern 
only the legal name or shell of the religious society. To the extent 
that they purport to determine the temporal rights and obligations 
of the religious society from which the corporation was formed, 
they are probably unconstitutional, or at best ineffective in the 
face of the strong judicial doctrines that have been discussed. This 
does not mean the statutes do not have to be complied with where 
they are applicable. It merely means that the existing statutes will 
110 See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra. 
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probably have no bearing upon the serious issues that will be 
posed by mergers-principally the question of whether the prop-
erties of the merged societies will go to the new institution that the 
merger produces, or remain with factions within those societies 
which refuse to approve the merger. 
The pertinent judicial doctrines are confusing and ill-defined, 
but there are enough actual cases in some areas to permit cautious 
prediction. For instance, there is probably not too much doubt 
now in cases involving properties of local churches affiliated with 
denominations of associated or hierarchical polity. There may be 
a knotty problem as to whether the polity is in fact hierarchical, 
but once this issue is determined the results in the cases are rea-
sonably certain and uniform. The courts will follow the decision 
of the highest church judicatory within that denomination. This is 
true whether the parties to the case be the higher church body 
and a recalcitrant local church or two factions within the local 
church. A few cases have specifically ruled that a local church does 
not have to go along with a denominational merger even though 
the denomination be one of hierarchical polity.120 Most cases, 
however, seem to require the local church to follow the higher 
authority into the merger,121 and it seems probable now, after the 
Kreshik case, that to absolve the local church from the duty to 
follow the hierarchical authority :would be unconstitutional. Thus 
the picture is fairly clear for denominations of hierarchical or 
associated polity. 
There may be problems where there is a contest within the 
hierarchy itself to determine which group represents the true 
church, and therefore whose ruling is to be followed by the courts 
in these cases. The Kreshik case, however, in spite of its possible 
logical flaws, probably settled this problem too; that group with 
the strongest and closest organizational connection with the 
traditional hierarchy will probably be preferred. 
In the case of congregationally organized churches, however, 
120 See Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909), later disapproved in 
Hayes v. Manning, 263 Mo. 1, 172 S.W. 897 (1914); Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 
S.W. 169 (1911); Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1908); cf. American 
Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Church, 140 Colo. 186, 343 P.2d 
711 (1959); Hayman v. St. Martin's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 227 Md. 338, 176 
A.2d 772 (1962). 
121 See Permanent Comm. of Missions v. Pacific Synod, Presbyterian Church, 157 
Cal. 105, 106 Pac. 395 (1909); Nagle v. Miller, 275 Pa. 157, 118 Atl. 670 (1922); Turbeville 
v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943); Reformed Bethanien Church v. Ochsner, 
72 S.D. 150, 31 N.W.2d 249 (1948); Brown v. Clark, 102 Tex. 323, 116 S.W. 360 (1909). 
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the law is far from clear. In the first place, it is difficult to say 
whether the Watson principle relating to congregational churches 
is now a principle of constitutional law. The Kreshik case con-
tains broad language generally endorsing Watson v. Jones; but if 
the congregational branch of the Watson doctrine is now a matter 
of constitutional law it is so by virtue of a dictum in the Kreshik 
case endorsing a dictum in the Watson case. It may be that when 
the Supreme Court is squarely faced with the necessity of apply-
ing the Watson case to resolve a property dispute within a con-
gregationally organized church it will refuse to do so. On the other 
hand, if property disputes within hierarchical churches are now 
to be regarded as covered by the first amendment, it is hard to see 
why the determination of property disputes within congregational 
churches should not likewise be subject to constitutional restric-
tions. And if constitutional limitations are applicable, it seems 
most likely that the limitation should be that prescribed by the 
dictum of Watson v. Jones, since that case is the only one decided 
by the Supreme Court containing any discussion of the distribu-
tion of property of congregational churches. 
But if the dictum of Watson v. Jones is now a principle of 
constitutional law as applied to congregational churches as well 
as to heirarchical churches, the question still remains whether the 
principle is simply that of majority rule without any other restric-
tion (as Mr. Justice Miller probably intended) or whether it in-
cludes the implied-trust idea that most states have attached as a 
limitation on the principle of majority rule. If the former proves 
to be the true interpretation, then the existing common law of 
most states on this point is unconstitutional, although the result 
in future cases is rather easily predictable. The properties will go 
with the majority faction in most cases. If the latter interpretation 
is correct, unless the inquiry is restricted to preserving denomina-
tional stability, there will remain in almost every case the problem 
of deciding the religious question of what are the basic tenets and 
usages of the church and what constitutes a fundamental deviation. 
The Supreme Court will have to declare a position on the question 
whether an attempted merger of local churches with one another, 
or of one denomination with another, or an attempt by the local 
church to abandon the denomination or to join another denomina-
tion because of an attempted merger or other reasons, constitute 
fundamental deviations, since these will be the real questions in 
most cases. 
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If the Kreshik case does not impose the congregational branch 
of the Watson doctrine upon the states, two views are possible 
under existing law. If the denominational organization has merged 
with another, congregations that vote by regular procedures to re-
main aloof from the merged denominations may be permitted to 
do so.122 The theory of such a result would be that where the 
denomination itself has abandoned its basic beliefs and usages by 
merging with another, the local church need not go along with 
the denomination. Even though it might not otherwise be allowed 
to dissolve its denominational connection, the local church is free 
to do so where the denomination no longer represents the tradi-
tional tenets and usages. On the other hand, it might be held that 
in such a situation the new merged denomination is but the con-
tinuation of the old ones, and that the local churches cannot 
abandon the denomination by mere majority vote. The denomina-
tional merger, in other words, might not be regarded as a funda-
mental deviation.123 
Because the position of the law with respect to hierarchical 
churches is reasonably clear, cases arising out of hierarchical 
churches are not so likely to come into the courts, except for cases 
like Watson and Kreshik involving a struggle between rival hier-
archies. But because of the confused state of the law relating to 
congregational churches, minority factions of congregational 
churches are encouraged to seek a judicial hearing before sub-
mitting to the majority's will in cases involving basic denomina-
tional changes, such as mergers. As the merger movement con-
tinues to gain momentum, the volume of church property dispute 
cases will surely increase. Moreover, the fear of merger or even 
of ~oose association with the ecumenical movement may produce 
conflicts within many local congregations, as it did in Huber v. 
Thorn, that can be presented to the courts in the form of prop-
erty contests. The courts will have to decide these cases, and the 
legal principles they have used to decide them in the past are 
principles resting mainly upon the interest of protecting the status 
quo. If they apply these principles, the courts will be cast into 
the role of generally opposing the ecumenical movement, at least 
122 See Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc'y v. Kenyon, 197 Misc. 124, 95 N.Y.S.2d 
133 (Sup. Ct. 1950), rev'd 279 App. Div. 1015, lll N.Y.S.2d 808 (1952), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 
151, ll6 N.E.2d 481 (1953). 
123 Cf. Spenningsby v. Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Trinity Congregation, 152 
Minn. 164, 188 N.W. 217 (1922). 
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insofar as congregationally organized churches are concerned. This 
may present a serious obstacle to what appears now to be a very 
basic reorientation of the Christian church away from separatism, 
which was the prevailing philosophy when our country and Con-
stitution were new, and toward ecumenicity. It is, of course, too 
early to say that this opposition will seriously frustrate the aspira-
tions of persons and groups engaged in this struggle for reunion 
and reconciliation. At the present time many religious groups 
do not accept ecumenicity as a worthy purpose. But the move-
ment seems to be growing in strength and in following. The dan-
ger that judicial opposition might seriously thwart it, as it did the 
labor movement, seems a real one. 
How can this result be prevented? The religious groups them-
selves, of course, can prevent many cases from entering the courts 
by effectively preparing their people for the merger. Since, how-
ever, under the prevailing legal principles even one member of 
a local congregation can raise the issue of fundamental deviation, 
it seems clear that educational work by the religious groups them-
selves will not be enough to solve all the problems. 
Legislation, which was effectively used in Canada to prevent 
much of the litigation that it was predicted would stem from the 
merger of the three groups that formed the United Church of 
Canada, does not promise much help in solving the problem in 
the United States.124 Canada did not have an establishment of 
religion clause as we do. Under the decisions of our Supreme 
Court a law tending to favor one religion over another, as any 
effective law prescribing the method of disposing of the property 
probably would have to do in one form or another, is vulnerable 
to attack on constitutional grounds. However, as has been pointed 
out, this same sort of preference of one religious persuasion over 
another inevitably results when courts decide these cases on com-
mon-law principles, and if this sort of preference can be done 
validly by judicial action it is hard to see why it could not be done 
by legislation. But even if legislation were constitutionally fea-
sible, state legislation would probably not be effective to solve the 
problem. Denominational mergers are usually nationwide in 
scope, and one state's law could not control the distribution of 
property situated in other states under our present conceptions 
of the interstate effects of state legislation and jurisdiction. And 
124 See SILCOX, CHURCH UNION IN CANADA (1933). 
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even if uniform state or federal legislation could somehow be em-
ployed constitutionally, the most difficult question still would re-
main: what sort of provisions should the law contain? It is doubt-
ful that any law would be effective unless it afforded some freedom 
to the religious institution to change its formal structure while at 
the same time providing some protection for the reasonable reli-
ance of the individual church members. No solution that is both 
practically and constitutionally feasible is immediately apparent. 
The doctrine of Watson v. Jones, without the "implied trust-
fundamental deviation" exception, is apparently constitutional 
and allows sufficient latitude for institutional change, but it does 
not give the protection to reliance by members of congregational 
churches that most state courts have felt necessary. Groups vitally 
affected by this dilemma, such as the National Council of Churches 
and perhaps even the state legislatures, should devote some serious 
attention to its solution. The interests of both the ecumenical 
movement and the administration of justice will be better served 
if church property disputes can be kept out of the courts. 
